Finite automata have been recently used as alternative, discrete models in theoretical physics, especially in problems related to the dichotomy between endophysical/intrinsic and exophysical/extrinsic perception (see, for instance [15, 18, 16, 7, 17, 4] ). These studies deal with Moore experiments; the main result states that it is impossible to determine the initial state of an automaton, and, consequently, a discrete model of Heisenberg uncertainty has been suggested. For this aim the classical theory of finite automata-which considers automata with initial states-is not adequate, and a new approach is necessary. A study of finite deterministic automata without initial states is exactly the aim of this paper. We will define and investigate the complexity of various types of simulations between automata. Minimal automata will be constructed and proven to be unique up to an isomorphism. We will build our results on an extension of Myhill-Nerode technique; all constructions will make use of "automata responses" to simple experiments only, i.e., no information about the internal machinery will be considered available.
Introduction
Recent applications of automata to theoretical physics (see [8, 12, 15, 18, 16, 7, 17] ) have shown that the classical theory of finite automata-which considers automata with initial states-is not adequate, and a new approach is necessary. Briefly, here is the story.
The theory of relativity altered the classical concept of physical objectivity but left open the possibility of a supreme mathematician who, in Einstein's view, neither cheats nor plays dice. Quantum mechanics went one step further: it not only did situate the experimenter in the universe, but it has stated that the experimenter can be modeled as a "sturdy, classical entity" composed of a macroscopic number of microscopic objects. The observer-who can neither predict nor control certain "spontaneous" microphysical events-is bound by complementarity-that is, informally speaking, either experience one certain type of observation (exclusive) or a different, complementary one. Complementarity is tied up with measurement, a highly controversial matter, as contemplations by Wigner [21] , Wheeler [19] , and Bell [1] , among many others, show. 1 Moore [14] was the first to study some experiments on finite deterministic automata 2 in an attempt to understand what kind of conclusions about the internal conditions of a finite machine it is possible to draw from input-output experiments. Machines we are going to consider are finite in the sense that they have a finite number of states, a finite number of input symbols, and a finite number of output symbols. A (simple) Moore experiment can be described as follows: a copy of the machine will be experimentally observed, i.e. the experimenter will input a finite sequence of input symbols to the machine and will observe the sequence of output symbols. The correspondence between input and output symbols depends on the particular chosen machine and on its initial state. The experimenter will study the sequences of input and output symbols and will try to conclude that "the machine being experimented on was in state q at the beginning of the experiment". 3 Moore's experiments have been studied from a mathematical point of view by various researchers, notably by Ginsburg [10] , Gill [9] , Chaitin [5] , Conway [6] , Brauer [3] , Calude, Calude, Svozil and Yu [4] . The main conclusion of these studies is that in it is impossible to determine the initial state of an automaton, and, consequently, a discrete model of Heisenberg uncertainty has been suggested. For this aim the classical theory of finite automata-which considers automata with initial states-is not adequate, so in this paper we are going to study finite deterministic automata without initial states. We will define and study the complexity of various types of simulations between automata. Minimal automata will be constructed and proven to be unique up to an isomorphism; this situation parallels and extends the classical theory of deterministic automata (see, for instance, [3, 13] ). We will build our results on an extension of Myhill-Nerode technique; all constructions will only make use of "automata responses" to simple experiments, i.e., no information about the internal machinery will be considered available.
Notation
If S is a finite set, then | S | denotes the cardinality of S. Let Σ be a finite set (sometimes called alphabet); the set Σ stands for the set of all finite words over Σ with the empty word denoted by λ. The length of a string x is denoted by | x |. In what follows all automata will be finite, i.e, they operate with a finte number of states, on finite input and output alphabets.
We fix two finite alphabets Σ and O: Σ contains input symbols, and O contains output symbols. A finite deterministic automaton consists of a finite set of states and a set of transitions from state to state that occur on input symbols chosen from Σ. For each symbol there is exactly one transition out of each state, possibly back to the state itself. Any state "emits" an output from the set O. The above definition does not include the so called initial states; this fact makes our definition different from the classical ones.
In this section we will deal only with deterministic automata; for this reason here we will omit the word deterministic.
Let A be an automaton. We can naturally extend the transition diagram ∆ A to a function, also denoted by ∆ A , from S A × Σ to S A as follows:
for all s ∈ S A , σ ∈ Σ and w ∈ Σ .
In drawing graph representations of automata, we denote states by • and label them with symbols from the output alphabet. The picture
Responses
Our goal is to define the notion of response of the automaton A = (S A , ∆ A , F A ) to an input signal, that is, to a word from Σ . We give several definitions to formalize this notion.
• The total response of the automaton A is the function R A : S A × Σ → O defined as follows:
where
• The final response of A is the function f A :
• The initial response of A is the function i A :
Here is an example. Consider Σ = {a, b}, O = {0, 1} and the three state automaton A presented in Figure 1 . The output function is defined by
Strong Simulation
We continue by giving a formal definition of the strong simulation. Informally, an automaton A is strongly simulated by B if B can perform all computations of B exactly in the same way. We say that A and B are strongly equivalent if they strongly simulate each other. Intuitively, a strong simulation has to take into account the "internal machinery" of the automaton, not only on the outputs.
be automata. We say that
• A is strongly simulated by B, or, equivalently, B strongly simulates A if there is a mapping h :
For all s ∈ S
We denote this by A B.
• A is strongly f -simulated (i-simulated) by B, or, equivalently, B strongly f -simulates (isimulates) A if there is a mapping h :
We denote this fact by A f B (A i B).
Lemma 2.1 If h : S A → S B and B strongly simulates
Proof. The proof follows directly using the induction on the length of w. If |w| = 1, then w = σ for some σ ∈ Σ and hence h(
Clearly, the strong simulation implies both strong f as well as strong i-simulations. In fact all these three notions are equivalent.
Theorem 2.1 Let A and B be automata. The following conditions are equivalent:
1) The automaton A is strongly simulated by B.
2) The automaton A is strongly i-simulated by B.
3) The automaton A is strongly f -simulated by B.
Proof. The implications 1) ⇒ 2) and 1) ⇒ 3) are obvious. We prove the implication 2) ⇒ 1). Suppose that B strongly i-simulates A via h : S A → S B . We need to show that the equality
holds for all s ∈ S A and w ∈ Σ. We prove (1) by induction on the length of w. For w = λ the equality R A (s, w) = R B (h(s), w) follows from the definition of strong i-simulation. Suppose that (1) holds for all s ∈ S A and w ∈ Σ with |w| ≤ n − 1. Let w ∈ Σ * , |w| = n − 1 and σ ∈ Σ. Then
Finally we have:
We continue with the implication 3) ⇒ 1). Suppose that B strongly f -simulates A via h : S A → S B . Again we will prove formula (1) by induction on the length of w.
. The induction step then can be performed similar to the computation corresponding to the i-simulation, as R A (s, wσ) = R A (s, w)f A (s, wσ). P
Behavioral Simulation
From an algebraic point of view, strong simulations are morphisms between automata; they make essential use of the internal machinery of automata, i.e. of the transition ∆, which is sometimes difficult to access. In this section we discuss another notion of simulation, the behavioral simulation, which is weaker than strong simulation. The behavioral simulation makes use only of the outputs produced by the automaton.
To motivate the formalization, we begin by presenting two automata A and B such that neither A strongly simulates B nor B strongly simulates A. However, in a behavioral sense these two automata "simulate" each other, i.e. they have the same behaviour. The input alphabet is {a} and the output alphabet is {0, 1}. Figure 2 gives a graph representation of A and Figure 3 represents B: It is not hard to see that A cannot strongly simulate B and B cannot strongly simulate A. However, the mapping h : S A → S B defined by:
satisfies the following property for all s ∈ S A and all w ∈ Σ : • A is f -simulated (i-simulated) by B, or, equivalently, B f-simulates (i-simulates) A if there is a mapping h : S A → S B such that for all s ∈ S A and w
)). We denote this fact by A ≤ f B (A ≤ i B).
A partial analogue of Theorem 2.1 holds true.
Theorem 2.2 An automaton A is simulated by B if and only if A can be f -simulated by B.

Proof. It is clear that if
holds true for all s ∈ S A and w ∈ Σ * . We prove, by induction on the length of w, that for all s ∈ S A and w ∈ Σ * ,
Clearly,
Finally, if (2) holds true, then for every σ ∈ Σ we have:
h(s), wσ). P
A counter-example showing that i-simulation is not equivalent to simulation can be found easily as i A (s, w) = F A (s), for all s ∈ S A and w ∈ Σ * .
Generalized Myhill-Nerode Equivalences
Let A = (S A , ∆ A , F A ) be an automaton. Let R be one of the response functions on A, that is, let R ∈ {R A , f A , i A }. Two states p and q from S A are R-equivalent if for all w ∈ Σ , R(p, w) = R(q, w).
If p and q are R-equivalent we denote this fact by p ≡ R q. Intuitively, if p and q are R-equivalent, then all computations of A which begin from p cannot be R-distinguished by computations of A which begin from q and vice-versa. It is immediate that ≡ R is an equivalence relation on S A . , w) , for some w ∈ Σ * . Then, for every σ ∈ Σ, we have:
Lemma 2.2 Let A be an automaton. Then for all p, q ∈ S A , p ≡ R A q if and only if
Remarks. a) Note that for every w ∈ Σ , we have ∆ A (p, w) ≡ f A ∆ A (q, w). Indeed, for all u ∈ Σ we have:
but the converse implication fails to hold true.
Universal Minimal Automata
Suppose that we have a finite class C containing pairs (
is universal for the class C if the following conditions hold:
2. For any s ∈ S A there is an i such that R A (s, w) = R Ai (q i , w), for all w ∈ Σ .
Every finite class which possesses universal automata is said to be complete. It is not hard to see that every automaton A (with no initial states) naturally defines a class C(A) for which A itself is universal. Indeed, let q 1 , . . . , q n ∈ S A be all states of A and for each i, define A i = A. Clearly A is universal for the class C(A) = { (A 1 , q 1 
Not every finite class of finite automata has a universal automaton. However, every class can be embedded into a complete one.
Proposition 2.1 Let C be a finite class of pairs of automata and initial states. There is a complete class
Assume that all the states of these automata are pairwise disjoint. Consider the automaton A obtained by taking the union of all these automata, that is
. Consider now the class C(A) as defined above. Clearly C is contained in C(A) and A is universal for C. P It turns out that the notion of universality is closely related to the notion of simulation. (S A , ∆ A , F A ) , q 1 , ) belongs to C(A). Then for all w ∈ Σ , we have R A1 (q 1 , w) = R B (h(q 1 ), w) . For every q ∈ S B there exists a state q ∈ S A such that for the pair (A = (S A , ∆ A , F A ), q ) we have R A (q , w) = R B (q, w) , for all w ∈ Σ . Hence B is universal for C(A). Now assume that A and B are universal for the class C = { (A 1 , q 1 ), (A 2 , q 2 ) . . . , , (A n , q n )}. For every q ∈ S A there exists an i such that R A (q, w) = R Ai (q i , w), for all w ∈ Σ . Since (A i , q i ) ∈ C and B is universal for C there is a p(q i ) ∈ S B such that R Ai (q i , w) = R B (p(q i ), w), for all w ∈ Σ . Hence A is simulated by B via mapping q → p(q i ). Similarly, B can be simulated by A. P Our next goal is to show that every complete class has a minimal universal automata. An automaton A universal for the class C is minimal if for every automaton B universal for the class C we have
From this definition and Theorem 2.3 above we obtain the following:
The following are equivalent:
1) The automaton A is a minimal universal automaton for a class C.
2) For every automaton B, if A ≤ B and B
Informally, a minimal automaton A is one which has the minimal possible number of states among all automata which have the same "computational power" as A. We will soon show that the notion of minimality implies uniqueness up to an "isomorphism".
An
if there is a one to one onto mapping h :
Clearly, if A is isomorphic to B, then A and B strongly simulate (hence simulate) each other. However, the converse implication is not always true. A simple example consists of two automata A and B over the alphabets Σ = {a} and O = {0, 1}. The automaton A has two states p and q such that 
Property 2.1 For all
Proof. Indeed, suppose that p = ∆ A (p, σ) and q = ∆ A (q, σ). Take any w ∈ Σ . Then
Define a new automaton M (A) as follows:
The above two properties show that the automaton M (A) is well-defined. 2) Any two minimal automata which simulate each other are isomorphic.
